“The reality is that in a very real sense the problems of Zimbabwe are our problems… Our entire region stands to benefit most directly from the recovery of Zimbabwe, in much the same way as Zimbabwe benefits from the progress of the region of Southern Africa, of which it is an integral and inalienable part.”

In many ways, this quote - plucked from Thabo Mbeki’s online ANC letter after the August 2007 Sadc summit in Zambia - encapsulates the dilemma that Mugabe’s Zimbabwe poses to the Southern African Development Community (Sadc).

In trying to promote the Sadc region, how do the Sadc members distance themselves from Zimbabwe without reducing investment in the region as a whole? And, at the same time, how can they not distance themselves without reducing investment in the region?

A thorn in Sadc's heel

"Sadc states have recorded strong growth over the past five to ten years, buoyed on primarily by increased macro-economic stability, improved political governance, favourable international conditions and an ongoing global commodities boom.

“However, while the individual member states themselves have been reforming, the advancement of the trade bloc as a whole — and its ability to communally court foreign investment — has been and continues to be severely undermined by the dramatic economic collapse in Zimbabwe.

“Due to the regional interaction of Sadc member states it is impossible to see the failure of Zimbabwe in isolation as the effect is felt across the region, including, albeit to a lesser extent, in South Africa. Sadc needs to be able to promote itself as a unified trade bloc with significant investment opportunities to the global community but this process has been impossible given the bad apple which is Zimbabwe, a country which should ideally be a leader in Africa."

Quiet diplomacy

Thus far, Sadc’s much-criticised approach to the problem has been ‘quiet diplomacy’. It seems fair to suggest that this approach has, in many ways, failed.

Although Sadc claims that Mbeki’s mediation between Mugabe and the opposition (the Movement for Democratic Change) was a success, the MDC itself claimed that the talks collapsed when Mugabe unilaterally declared a 29 March date for general elections. Furthermore, they claimed that Zanu-PF reneged on agreements to implement a new constitution and make legislative reforms before an election was held.

“We think that the facilitating team always believed that Zanu-PF would realise what is in the national interest and would respond positively… In that they were mistaken,” said the MDC spokesperson.

The ‘national interest’ hardly seems a concern of a government which has overseen the economy whilst the inflation rate rocketed over 100 000 percent, unemployment rose to 85 percent and basic commodities became scarce. Add to this the alleged human rights abuses, the illegal detainment (and torture) of the opposition and the stifling of the media, and it is safe to say that Mugabe’s government is not acting according to the Sadc principle of “human rights, democracy and the rule of law”.

Unfortunately, ‘solidarity’ and ‘sovereignty’ are also principles on which Sadc is founded. So what, if any, are the alternatives to ‘quiet diplomacy’ and, should Mugabe win the March elections, where does Sadc stand?

Mugabe’s hold on power

In attempting to understand the approach taken by Sadc, it is first necessary to understand the enigma that is Robert Mugabe and the sway that he holds in African politics.

Although Mugabe is now reviled by most of the western world, there was a stage – even after the Gukuvahundi ethnic massacres (1982 – 1985), in which more that 20 000 civilians were killed – that he was regarded by the west as a shining light in Africa capable of bringing about a peaceful transition to democracy.

While his land reform policy sparked western condemnation and triggered the current animosity, it was applauded by many on the African continent. To many, Mugabe is a freedom fighter who continues to stick it to the colonial man. All his detractors and critics are neo-colonists or agents of the west and the current hardships faced by Zimbabweans are not a result of his government’s incompetence and corruption, but rather a result of western colonisation, sanctions and interference.

Like so many African leaders, his ‘freedom fighter’ credentials give him immunity from prosecution for any current crimes, including those against his own people. This attitude is demonstrated in a June 2007 opinion piece (BBC World Magazine) written by former Zambian president and Mugabe ally, Kenneth Kaunda, following the furore about the detainment and beating of opposition leaders.

“Leaders in the West say that Robert Mugabe is a demon, that he has destroyed Zimbabwe and that he must be got rid of – but this demonising is made by people who may not understand what Robert Gabriel Mugabe and his fellow freedom fighters went through.”

Mugabe’s experience, independence credentials and continued opposition to colonial rulers also afford him a certain degree of respect amongst Southern African leaders (as the applause he received at the Sadc summit demonstrated). And those who do not respect him are generally bullied into submission.

In March 2007, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa became the first African leader to criticise Mugabe when he compared Zimbabwe to a ‘sinking Titanic’ and claimed that quiet diplomacy had failed.

It has been alleged by numerous diplomats – although officially denied – that at the August summit, hosted by Zambia, an altercation occurred between Mwanawasa and Mugabe after the former described the situation in Zimbabwe as ‘unacceptable’. Mugabe is alleged to have given Mwanawasa a thorough dressing-down, before threatening to quit the regional bloc and storming out of the conference.

Although the Sadc leaders later claimed that no such altercation took place, it is interesting to note that following the summit, Mwanawasa changed his tune on Zimbabwe, suggesting that the reports are ‘exaggerated’ and that the west has no business interfering in Zimbabwe’s affairs.

Sadc solidarity

The fact that Mugabe is an experienced politician and savvy manipulator definitely works in his favour. His grip on the organisation, however, would not be so strong if it were for Sadc’s desire to present a united front to the rest of the world. The strong ‘us versus them’ mentality means that any country or leader that stands against Mugabe would be considered lackeys of Europe and the USA.

In the case of South Africa, this is dilemma is more pronounced. As the economic powerhouse of the region, South Africa is the USA of Africa. Powerful, but also somewhat despised, South Africa needs to prove that it acts in the interests of the group, whilst at the same time convincing the west that something is, in fact, being done about the problem.

Hence, quiet diplomacy. While this approach has received much criticism in the South African media and abroad, the alternatives – sanctions and military action – are not necessarily any more viable.

Sovereignty of states

At the August 2007 summit, Sadc criticised EU and US sanctions on Zimbabwe, blaming them for some of the country’s economic woes and floundering tourism industry.

However, the sanctions are not against the country, but rather against select individuals. The sanctions include a travel ban against top officials, the freezing of their assets in European and US banks and a ban on arms sales. Unless the wealth of the country is disproportionately controlled by the government, this is hardly likely to have a massive impact on the economy. Somewhat ironically, Britain is also the biggest single donor paying for food aid in Zimbabwe, which is necessary to sustain more than half the population.

Sadc’s, and more particularly South Africa’s, aversion to sanctions is interesting considering the influence that sanctions had on the apartheid regime. Like the aversion to military intervention, it is based on the principle of sovereignty of states. However, that principle assumes that the state is a legitimate one. While the apartheid regime was obviously illegitimate, to assume that Zimbabwe isn’t because it is run by an African is a fallacy that continues to plague African politics.

Speaking on Zimbabwe and South Africa’s approach of ‘silent diplomacy’, Nobel Peace Prize-winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu had the following to say about the sovereignty of states:

“It is a principle that, if consistently observed, would have shielded the apartheid government in South Africa from external criticism and from economic sanctions and political pressure that forced it to change.”

As Zimbabwe’s primary export and import partner, South Africa has the capability of bringing the country to its knees (although this seems a little redundant in light of the fact that Mugabe has already done so). However, doing so would have a devastating effect on Zimbabweans and would cause undue pressure on South Africa as more Zimbabweans flee across the border. An estimated three million Zimbabweans have already put strain on the South African economy.

Alternatively it, and other Sadc countries, could follow the examples of the EU and US by imposing targeted sanctions on the Mugabe regime. And, there lies the ideological glitch, because to do so – no matter how effective – would be seen as a betrayal of African brotherhood.

Military intervention is even less likely. The Sadc Brigade, which is made up of contributions from various Sadc states and is essentially a peacekeeping unit, can only be used to intervene in another member state’s domestic affairs if permission has been given by the state or if all peaceful means of resolving the conflict are unsuccessful.

Although South Africa is economically powerful, its military is not particularly impressive. In fact, official figures would suggest that the South African and Zimbabwean armies are of similar sizes. Furthermore, military intervention is a highly unlikely option for South Africa which is still putting the apartheid regime’s destructive military interventions in neighbouring countries behind it.

Where does this leave Sadc?

Dictators rarely retire and Mugabe, with the sanction of Sadc, will continue to plunder his nation (ironically making it even more dependent on former colonisers Britain) and in doing so, will jeopardise the investment opportunities of the entire region. Solidarity – in principle – is not the problem. In this case, however, Sadc’s solidarity lies not with the people of Zimbabwe, but with their despotic leader and habits of loyalty mean that this is unlikely to change.